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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOLAR SALT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action seeking injunction against the 
maintenance of a public nuisance, i. e. the pollution of 
the Great Salt Lake, for abatement of a private nuisance 
including the obstruction of the waters of Great Salt Lake 
so as to cause them to back onto and flood lands Appellant 
(herein called "Solar") owns or is entitled to occupy, and 
for damages associated with special injury Solar has suffered 
by reason of the perpetration of the nuisance. 
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., granted summary 
judgment to Respondent (herein called the "SP"). Judgment 
was granted on the pleadings; discovery related only to 
the location of lands Solar claimed to own, the nature of 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 14427 
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Solar's title, and the sources of Solar*s claimed rights 
in land and water* In essence the trial court ruled that, 
even if every allegation of Solar's complaint is true, 
Solar still has no status to sue, and the law of Utah 
affords no remedy for Solar's injury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purposes of this proceeding, the facts 
must be assumed to be as alleged in the complaint except 
as Solarfs responses to interrogatories may contradict 
those allegations, and we are aware of no contradictions. 
The operative facts, then, are these: 
1. Before 1956, Solar made investments 
in a salt extraction plant on the shores of 
the Great Salt Lake and in the development of 
markets for and means of transporting salt. 
Its operations in this regard represented a 
multimillion dollar investment at the time the 
complaint was filed. 
2. In 1959, the SP constructed a causeway 
across the Great Salt Lake at a location and in 
a manner which obstructed the natural flow and 
movement of the lake waters. 
3. Since the causeway emplacement, there 
has been a change in the chemistry of the lake 
marked by migration of contained mineral salts 
to the area north of the causeway (the "north lake"). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The north lake brines have become supersaturated 
in halite so that millions of tons have deposited 
on the north lake bed and been lost to economical 
harvest. The north lake brines have become an 
intolerable environment for any form of life 
except a peculiar red alga. The brine shrimp 
which once proliferated in the north lake and 
which constituted the only natural biological 
filtering agent for the lake have been extinguished. 
The red alga blooms unmetabolized, colors the water, 
and makes it turbid. Moreover, the alga, being 
organic material, is subject to decay in low water 
cycles. The coelenterate life which once abounded 
in the north lake (the coral-like reefs of the 
north lake were beautiful and fascinating) is 
also obliterated. All of the recreational advan-
tages of the north lake are gone. 
4. The causeway has operated as a dam and 
has backed water onto Solar's land without its 
permission. 
5. All of the above phenomena are directly 
attributable to the SP's emplacement of its cause-
way. 
6. Solar has sustained special injury because 
of the SP induced changes in the Great Salt Lake 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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chemistry and destruction of the Great Salt 
Lake ecosystem. The lake at Solar's- plant 
location represents a diminished and depleted 
raw material source- Solar has been placed 
at a competitive disadvantage with respect to 
other salt harvesters, and Solar's lands have 
been flooded. 
ISSUES OH APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is simply whether the law of Utah 
affords any relief to Solar in the fact situation stated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S. RULING IN MORTON* 
IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS CASE 
In Morton, this court ruled that Morton Salt Company 
(in circumstances similar to Solar's) did not state a cause 
of action against the SP by merely alleging that the SP had 
caused a redistribution of the lake's salt load unless it 
also identified in its pleadings the source and nature of 
Morton's right that some particular degree of salinity be 
maintained. Morton relied entirely on its diligence rights 
to lake water, its royalty agreement with the State, and 
the instrument (claimed to be a third party beneficiary 
contract) by which the State granted to the SP a causeway 
MORTON SALT COMPANY VS. SOUTHERN PACIFIC, 27 U2d 256, 435 P2d 
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easement. None of these, said this court, conferred a 
right which was violated by the mere dilution of or re-
distribution of solids in the lake brines. 
Solar, in this action, does not rely on contractual 
rights except to establish the value of its enterprise. 
The rights Solar asserts are statutorily conferred. For 
the court's convenience, we will here identify and quote 
the relevant language from the statutes on which we rely 
(with emphasis, of course, added). 
•73-14-2 (a) UCA 1953 as amended: 
"Pollution means such . . . alteration 
of the physical, chemical or biological pro-
perties of any waters of the state . . . as ' 
will . . . render such water harmfull or 
detrimental or injurious to . . . domestic, 
commercial, industrial, agricultural, recre-
ational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, 
or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish 
or other aquatic life." 
73-14-5 (a) UCA 1953 as amended: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to 
cause pollution as defined in Section 73-14-
2(a) of any waters of the state. . . . Any 
such action is hereby declared to be a public 
nuisance." 
78-38-1 UCA 1953 as amended: 
"Anything which is . . . an obstruction 
to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or pro-
perty, is a nuisance and the subject of an 
action. Such action may be brought by any 
person whose property is injuriously affected, 
or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by 
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance 
may be enjoined or abated, and damages may 
also be recovered." 
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78-38-2' UGA 1953 as amended: 
• *I"£ a guardian, tenant for life or 
years, joint tenant or tenant in common, 
of real property commits waste thereonF 
any person aggrieved by the waste may 
bring an action therefor, in which action 
there may be a judgement for treble 
damages*11 
7 3-1-15 OCA 1953 as amended:1 
"Whenever a person/ partnership, com-
pany or corporation has a right of way „, . 
for any.. ..' * watercourse, it shall be 
unlawful for any person, persons or govern-
mental agencies to place or maintain in 
place any obstruction, or change of the 
waterflow by fence or otherwise, along 
or across or in such . . . watercourse 
• . • without first receiving written 
persmission for the change and provide 
gates sufficient for the passage of the 
owner or owners of such . . . watercourse 
. * . any person, partnership, company 
or corporation, violating the provisions 
of this section shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and is subject to damages 
and costs." 
Solar relies not only on the statute but also on the venerable 
doctrine of Utah law that an appropriator of water has a right 
that the v/ater flow in its natural course without interruption. 
The doctrine is well states in Wrathall vs. Johnson, 86 Utah 
50, 40 P2d 755 as follows: 
"Under both the common-law doctrine of 
riparian right or ownership and the doctrine 
of appropriation, one located nearer to the 
source was not permitted to cut off or interrupt 
or diminish or pollute the source. A right once 
established upon a stream or source of supply 
vested in the owner of such right an interest in 
the stream to the the source. Cole & Thomas v. 
Richards Irr. Co., 27 Utah 205, 7S P. 376, 101 
Am. St. Rep. 962? Yates v. Newton, 59 Utah 105, 
202 P. 208; Chandler"et ah v. Utah Copper Co., 
43 Utah 479, 135 P.~106. Such vested interest 
is not an ownership of the corpus of the water 
in the same sense as the ownership of land, and, 
until the water is conducted into the canal, 
reservoir, or other container belonging to the 
appropriator, the right is that of use and to 
have it flow to his place of use without inter-
ruption. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Not one of these statutes was cited by Morton, nor did 
the court appear to consider them in rendering the Morton 
decision. Dilution alone may not give rise to a cause of 
action, but it is a different matter to so change the lake 
that aquatic life is destroyed, recreational values are 
lost, and industrial water uses are impaired. 
We will discuss the nature of private redress for 
injury from public nuisance in a later section of this 
brief. 
POINT II 
THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN 
HARDY* IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF 
THIS CASE 
In Hardy, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals unques-
tionably upheld the Honorable Willis W. Ritter in his ruling 
that Morton, despite the obvious fact that no public nuisance 
issue was raised in it, precludes recovery by a private liti-
gant for special damages suffered as a result of public 
nuisance. It is evident from the Hardy decision, we believe, 
that the appellate court confirmed Judge Ritter with some 
reluctance. "The responsibility of the federal courts, 
in matters of local law1', said Judge Holloway, "is not 
to formulate the legal mind of the state, but merely to 
ascertain and apply it," and "the views of the resident 
District Judge are persuasive and ordinarily accepted". 
_ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _____ 
HARDY SALT COMPANY VS. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO., 
501 F2d 1156. 
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In this appeal proceeding, it is necessary that 
Solar convince this court that Judge Ritter did not 
comprehend "the legal mind of the state" in Hardy, and 
that this Court did not intend in Morton to judicially 
repeal the statutes we have above cited nor to reverse 
its previous ruling that one who sustains, a special injury 
from a public nuisance has direct resort to the judicial 
system. 
The circuit court did not, incidentally, affirm 
Judge Ritter on the basis of any interpretation of the 
facts with regard to pollution and public nuisance. Indeed, 
the decision assumes and almost proclaims that the pollution, 
and public nuisance have been demonstrated. On page 1164 
of the Hardy decision, the court said: 
"Thus, while the District Court made no 
finding on the issue, the plaintiff's proof 
was substantial that Southern Pacific has 
caused pollution creating a public nuisance". 
The views of this court need not, of course, conform 
to those of the resident federal district judge even as 
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
"legal mind of the state" must be formulated by the statefs 
judiciary. While Hardy is relevant, it is in no sense- con-
trolling authority. The editors of American Jurisprudence 
have this to say on the subject: 
"State Courts are not bound to follow a 
decision of a federal court, even the United 
States Supreme Court, dealing with state law. 
Thus a state court is not bound to follow a 
decision of a federal court, even the United 
States Supreme Court, construing the constitu-
tion or a statute of that state". (20 Am Jur 
556) 
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POINT III 
ONE WHO CREATES AND MAINTAINS A 
PUBLIC NUISANCE MUST RESPOND IN 
DAMAGES TO PRIVATE CITIZENS WHO 
SUSTAIN SPECIAL INJURY BY REASON 
OF THE NUISANCE 
The complaint here states a cause based upon Utah's 
Water Pollution Act (the "Act") Title 73, Chapter 14, UCA 
1953 as amended. The Act became law in 1953, was effective 
when the SP applied for its dike easement, and has been 
effective at all times since. 
The Act, in Section 2, defines pollution (deleting 
language not relevant to this proceeding) as: 
"Any . . . alteration of the physical, 
chemical or biological properties of any 
waters of this state as will . . . render such 
waters harmful or detrimental or injurious to 
. . . commercial, industrial . .•. recreational 
or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to 
. . . fish or other aquatic life." 
The Act nowhere provides or suggests that, to constitute pollu-
tion, the "alteration" must result from any input of contaminant 
substances. It is simply the announced public policy to prevent 
any activity which causes pollution as pollution is defined. 
Besides defining pollution, the Act, in Section 73-14-5 
(a), provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to 
cause pollution . . . any such action is hereby declared to 
be a public nuisance". The complaint herein unquestionably 
alleges that the SP has caused pollution and created a public 
nuisance. 
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The right of a private person to sue for special 
damages resulting from a public nuisance has been fre-
quently treated in texts and cases. There is Frothing 
abstruse about the doctrine which has evolved. A private 
individual may sue for public nuisance if he can show 
special injury, different in kind or, in some jurisdictions, 
merely in degree from the injury suffered by the public 
at large. Perhaps as succinct as any textual statement 
on the subject is the following from Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Volume 66, Page 833: 
§ 79. — Nature and Extent of Special Injury 
a. In general 
b . Determination; particular Injuries 
a. In General 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, i n 
order to entitle an individual to relief against a pub-
lic nuisance, it is essential that he show that he has 
suffered or will suffer some specific injury other than 
that in which the general public share alike. 
As a general rule, in the absence of a statute to 
the contrary, it is essential co the right of an indivi-
dual to relief against a public nuisance that he should 
show that he has suffered or will suffer some special 
injury other than that in which^all the general public 
share alike, and, as a general rule, within the limita-
tions noted hereinafter, the difference between the 
injury to him and the injury to the general public 
must be one of kind or character, and not merely of 
degree. Such special injury must be established re-
gardless of whether a statute or ordinance has been 
violated by defendant. 
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T o the rule that a person damaged by a nuisance 
cannot recover, if his damages be of the same char-
acter, as those sustained by the public, a limitation is 
recognized where the particular nuisance is both a 
public and a private one, and it has been held that in 
such a case an action may be maintained by an indivi-
dual although many other persons may sustain l ike 
injuries from the same nuisance; and it has also been 
held that relief may be had by a private individual 
against a public nuisance when the injury complain-
ed of is only greater in degree to complainant. T h e 
rule requiring some injury peculiar to himself, and 
differing in kind and degree from that suffered by 
the public generally, has been held to apply only t o 
that class of nuisances which are, in strictness, publ ic 
nuisances without more. I t has been held that t he 
ru le does not obtain where the nuisance, a l though 
public from its extent and place, by its very existence 
involves the invasion of the personal and pr iva te 
rights of individuals; that with respect to the la t ter 
class of nuisance an actionable wrong arises in favor 
of all persons who come within the effects and in-
fluence, and whose rights of personal property- a r e 
injuriously affected; that in such case it is not re-
quired, in order to sustain such action, that the per-
son injured should establish damage differing in k ind 
and degree from others in like circumstances, how-
ever numerous they may be; and that the r ight of 
action in such cases is sustained by showing the exist-
ence of an appreciable damage to plaintiff, whether 
such damage be special or otherwise. 
Solar's injury here is, of course, different in kind 
and degree from that suffered by the public at large. Solar 
has devoted a half century of effort, industry, research, 
and investment to a business venture based upon the resource 
which the Great Salt Lake represents in its natural state. 
The general public has suffered no injury except (1) the 
loss of lake values as some billion tons of halite has been 
deposited on the bed of the north lake, and (2) the loss of 
a public recreational resource as the north lake has become 
almost totally necrotic. 
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The special injury which Solar has sustained is 
adequately alleged in the complaint and is obvious from 
the circumstances, Solar invested heavily in plant designed 
to extract the very mineral which the SP has rendered unre-
coverable in the commission of statutory and common law 
waste* Solar has been put to great expenses in enlarging 
and redesigning its plant in order to harvest from a public 
mineral source which has been greatly diminished in value, 
by the SP's maintenance of a public nuisance. 
The Utah court very early considered a. situation 
where a defendant was alleged to have created a public 
nuisance by contaminating a watercourse from which the 
plaintiffs had standing to sue by reason of special injury 
resulting from the defendant's maintenance of a public 
nuisance. In that case (Northpoint Irrigation Company 
vs. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, 16 U 246, 52 P 163) 
the court was construing a different statute., one which 
defined public nuisance generally, but it clearly declared 
the right of a private citizen to seek relief from injury 
attributable to public nuisance. 
There are a great many cases, involving suits by 
individuals against perpetrators of public nuisances, 
where the injury complained of has been based upon some 
property right lesser in quality than a fee interest in 
real property. We call the court's particular attention 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to J. RL Miles & Company vs. McLean Contracting Company, 
180 F2d 789. In that case, the plaintiff sued for damages 
resulting from dredging operations which deposited silt 
and mud on oyster beds from which the plaintiff had some 
right, as a licensee from the state to harvest oysters. 
That right, said the court, was a sufficient property 
interest on which to support an action for damages but 
which "we think we are not called upon to define specifi-
cally or fit into precise legal category". The court 
cited with approval the cases of Hampton vs. North Car-
olina Pulp Company, 27 SE2d 538 and 132 F2d 840, wherein 
a riparian proprietor on a navigable river was held to 
have status to sue an upstream polluter for injury to 
fish in the river even though the plaintiff obviously 
had no proprietary interest in the fish. 
In Hampton, the court made this comment on the 
public nuisance concept; 
{4} " W e think our decision here finds some 
support in the well settled rule that a private indi-
vidual may sue on a public nuisance when h e can 
show that he has, by virtue of this nuisance, sustained 
damages to him of a special character, distinct and 
different from the injury suffered by the publ ic gen-
erally. See, 39 Am. Ju r . § 124, pages 378 et seq., 
and the host of cases there cited,.particularly Nor th-
ern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whalen, 149 U.S. 157, 
13 S.Ct. 822, 37 L.Ed. 686; Northern Transportat ion 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 25 L.Ed. 336; 
Sullivan v. American Manufacturing Co., 4 Cir., 33 
F.2d 690; Henry v. City of Newburyport , 149 Mass. 
5S2, 22 N.E. 75, 5 L.R.A. 179; Rhymer v. Fretz, 206 
Pa. 230, 55 A. 959, 98 Am.St. Rep. 777; Meredith 
v. Tiple Island Gunning Club, 113 Va. 80, 73 SJE. 
721, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 286, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 531 ; 
Beveridge v. Lacey, 24 Va. 63. Certainly Miles has 
here sustained such special and distinct damage, apar t 
from the injury suffered by the public/* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Maddox vs. International Paper Company, 4 7. F. 
Supp. 829, 105 F. Supp* 89, 203 F2d 88, was a suit 
brought on two occasions by the proprietor of a fishing 
camp against a polluter of public waters,, Bodcau Bayou, 
in Louisiana. The pertinent holding of the case is 
that the plaintiff? by virtue only of his having developed 
a fishing camp on the shores of the Bayou, had the kind of 
interest which would support an action against a polluter 
of public waters. 
Without reference to the public nuisance aspects 
of the SPfs conduct here complained of, the changes in 
the lake characteristics which have resulted from the 
causeway constitute a private nuisance within the meaning 
of the Utah statute identified in the complaint. The 
Tenth Circuit's ruling on this point is no more controlling 
than its ruling on the public nuisance point. 
POINT IV 
SOLAR HAS STATUTORY STATUS TO SUE 
BECAUSE THE SP'S USE OF THE PROPERTY 
SUBJECT TO ITS EASEMENT CONSTITUTES 
WASTE 
Much of the confusion about the common law action 
of waste is associated with determining who has the right 
to maintain it. The elements of the action are easily 
understood. Waste is the "destruction, misuse, alteration., 
or neglect of premises by one lawfully in. possession thereof 
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to the prejudice of the estate or interest therein of 
another" (56 Am Jur 450, Waste Section 2). As a matter 
of evolution, the action was at first maintainable only 
by one having an immediate estate of inheritance* The 
class of plaintiffs has been enlarged, however, by statute 
and decision. The concept persists that the kind of injury 
which gives rise to the action is an injury to the rever-
sion or inheritance. That is, most jurisdictions require 
proof that the owner of the basic fee estate will eventually 
have restored to him a property which is intrinsically 
diminished by the activity of the defendant (56 Am Jur 
458). 
The restriction of the plaintiff class to those 
who have an estate of inheritance has been increasingly 
criticized. The New York Law Revision Commission, in 
its 1935 report on this subject, stated what ought to be 
the objective of the law of waste as follows: 
"The law of waste is a part of the regu-
lation of the relations between persons who 
simultaneously have interests in the same 
thing. Normally, one of these persons is 
in possession and the others are out of 
possession. Such a circumstance requires 
that the one in possession be forbidden such 
action as will diminish the market value of 
the other interests, and that he be required 
to act fairly in the maintenance of the 
property." 
The 1951 Utah Legislature, whether influenced by the 
New York Commission's brand of thinking or not, enacted what 
is codified as Section 78-38-2 UCA 1953, which provides: 
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"If a guardian, tenant for life or years
 f 
joint tenant, or tenant in common of real pro-
perty commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved 
by the waste may bring an action against him" 
therefor, in which action there may be a judgment 
for treble damages." (our emphasis) 
In the instant case, we have a situation where the 
parties and others simultaneously had interests in the Great 
Salt Lake. Certainly, the SP and the State of Utah had 
simultaneous interests in the very land on which the dike 
was installed. The SP has used the lands for the purpose 
contemplated by its easement but in a manner which has 
unnecessarily and unreasonably diminished the value of 
others! interests including the value of the estate of 
inheritance or reversion. While Solar does not hold the 
estate of reversion, Solar is most particularly "aggrieved" 
by the SP!s commission of waste. 
POINT V 
THE SP!S DAMMING OF THE LAKE SO 
AS TO FLOOD SOLAR1S LAND IS AC-
TIONABLE 
The complaint alleges that the causeway constitutes 
a dam which has backed up the lake waters so that Solar's 
lands, owned and leased, have been inundated or saved from 
inundation at considerable expense. The SP now asserts 
that the situation, even if all the complaint*s allegations 
on this score are true, does not give rise to a cause of 
action. 
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The general rule (in both riparian and desert 
jurisdictions) is that "no one has the right to project 
on adjoining lands, without the owner's consent, water 
that would not otherwise have flowed thereon; and if he 
does so, he may be held liable for an actionable wrong" 
(78 Am Jur 2d 790). The annotators cite some fourteen 
cases in support of tie stated legal proposition, and we 
are not aware that tha SP asserts a different one. The 
notion the SP appears co entertain is that its easement 
from the state carried with it a right to flood the lands 
on which south shore proprietors were conducting their 
business, at least to the degree those lands are in state 
ownership. 
The instrument by which the state conveyed to the 
SP a right to emplace its causeway does not expressly 
include any right to flood or add to the water burden of 
lake bed lands with regard to which lessees from the state 
had prior rights. If the SP obtained any rights, it must 
have acquired them by implication. We find no case where 
the constructor of an obstruction within a public water-
course under a grant from a public agency has asserted 
an implied right to flood riparian lands occupied by others 
as lessees from the same public agency. Courts have, however, 
considered whether a grant of authority, even by a state 
legislature, to build a bridge across a river authorizes 
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the grantee to obstruct navigation. The courts have 
consistently held that a right to interfere with estab-
lished uses is never implied* See Commonwealth vsr 
Charlestown, 18 Mass.'180/ State vs. Hutchings, 79 NH 
132, 105 AtX. 519, 2ALR 1685* In any event, Solar 
contends that the burden is on the SP to establish 
that its easement includes the right to flood stats 
owned but previously leased lands. 
CONCLUSION 
The law throughout the nation has historically 
been that a private citizen has standing in the courts 
to seek abatement of a public nuisance which does him special 
injury and to recover damages for that injury. Not only did 
Utah's decisional law so hold before Morton, but also Utah's 
statutes have long been explicit. 
While the federal district court for Utah has 
ascertained the "legal mind of the state1'
 f as expressed 
by Morton, to be that private citizens specially damaged 
by public nuisance no longer have access to the courts# 
we submit that the perception of the federal court was 
erroneous, and Judge Hanson erred in treating Hardy as 
controlling precedent. 
That the SP should be allowed to maintain a 
structure which has such enormous negative impact on 
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a primary public asset is outrageous. It is a sorry 
judicial system indeed which will provide no remedy 
for those who sustain direct and particular injury 
for such nuisance. 
*-£ 
Respectfully submitted this / ^ ^ day of April, 
1976. 
^ZJJ^U, ...^ • si ycctu^. 
FRANK J. ALLEN^ '--
Attorney for Appellant 
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